



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

File: [REDACTED] Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CA

Date:

JAN 25 2001

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

Application: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

identification data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

[Signature]
for Mary C. Mulrean, Acting Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of India who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation in 1990. In 1993, the applicant married a lawful permanent resident of the United States who subsequently naturalized as a United States citizen in 1996. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved petition for alien relative and seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States and reside with his spouse and child.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel argues that although the applicant's misrepresentation is a negative factor in considering his application for a waiver of inadmissibility, the Attorney General should grant the request so that the applicant's United States citizen spouse will not suffer extreme hardship.

The record reflects that the applicant procured admission into the United States by fraud and willful misrepresentation in 1990 by presenting a passport and visa provided to him by a professional smuggler.

Section 212(a) CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States:

(6) ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AND IMMIGRATION VIOLATORS.-

(C) MISREPRESENTATION.-

(i) IN GENERAL.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) ADMISSION OF IMMIGRANT INADMISSIBLE FOR FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT.-

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the

Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. See Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996, A.G. 1997).

If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. Matter of George and Lopez-Alvarez, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); Matter of Leveque, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

After reviewing the amendments to the Act and to other statutes regarding fraud and misrepresentation from 1957 to the present time, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for § 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, Interim Decision 3380 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors

deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, the Board also held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a § 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998), followed. The Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm. 1979); Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm. 1979), and noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the applicant's spouse is a very young woman (23 years old) with a small child (5 years old) who has been married to the applicant for 7 years. Her income is less than half of what her husband provides. Because the couple's marriage caused their families to disown them, financial support would not be expected from her family should it be needed. If her husband is required to depart the United States, counsel claims that his spouse would need either to receive public assistance or go to India with him. Counsel asserts that in India, the applicant would earn even less than she does in the United States, would be in an environment where medication is not available and the sanitary conditions are questionable, and would face harsh treatment due to her being a Moslem from Afghanistan.

There are no laws that require the applicant's wife and child to leave the United States and live abroad. In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

In Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan

v. INS, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being removed. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

In addition, in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), the court held that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

It should also be noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity (referred to as an after-acquired family tie in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998)), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1990 by fraud and willful misrepresentation and married his spouse in 1993. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

A review of the factors presented, and the aggregate effect of those factors, indicates that the applicant's spouse would suffer hardship due to separation. The applicant has failed, however, to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal disruptions involved in the departure of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing the favorable or unfavorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957). Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.